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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
EMERALD OIL COMPANY, a corpo- * 
ration, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant.
 / 
Case No 
> 7984 
Petition For Rehearing 
And Brief In Support Thereof 
TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF UTAH: 
Plaintiff respectfully petitions the court to grant a 
rehearing in the above entitled cause on the ground that 
the court erred in presuming as a matter of law that the 
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income of plaintiff, a domestic corporation, was attributa-
ble to business carried on in Utah, and therefore, subject 
to the franchise tax imposed by Title 59, Chapter 13, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are undisputed and are stated fully in the 
original brief filed by plaintiff in this case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The presumption of law that plaintiff was doing 
business in Utah within the purview of the Utah statute 
is contrary to the facts and in direct conflict with estab-
lished law on this subject. 
2. The evidence in this case, which is not in conflict, 
shows that plaintiff transacted no business in Utah which 
yielded the income upon which the franchise tax is based. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LAW THAT PLAIN-
TIFF WAS DOING BUSINESS IN UTAH 
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE UTAH 
STATUTE IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS 
AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ESTAB-
LISHED LAW ON THIS SUBJECT. 
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The opinion written by Chief Justice Wolfe contains 
the following statement, upon which the decision in this 
case must rest: 
"A domestic corporation organized for pur-
poses of profit and which receives income must be 
doing business somewhere. If the petitioner cannot 
be said to be doing business in Colorado so as to 
justify the allocation to Colorado of a portion of 
its net income derived from 'business done' there, 
the income received by such corporation is presumed 
to be allocable to Utah." 
The foregoing statement is sheer judicial tax legisla-
tion, deriving no support from the language expressed in 
the statute and in direct conflict with the rule of law firmly 
established by the decisions of many state and federal 
courts which were cited in our original brief and some of 
which heretofore have been cited with approval by this 
court. The same proposition as contained in the quoted 
pronouncement of Chief Justice Wolfe was advanced by 
the Attorney General of the State of New York and rejected 
by the highest court of that state. People V. Knapp, 229 
N. Y. 502, 128 N. E. 892. Justice Collin of the Court of 
Appeals of New York, in construing the New York fran-
chise tax statute, held: 
"It is not correct reasoning to assert that the 
relator must be doing business in New York because 
it was not doing business in New Jersey. A corpo-
ration is not more bound to pursue the activities of 
business than is the private citizen. It may, as may 
he, enter into and then retire from business, or re-
frain from business. Nor is every exercise of its 
chartered powers and purposes the doing of business 
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within the purview of the Tax Law. We hold that 
under the facts presented the relator was not, with-
in the year ending October 31, 1916, doing business 
in this state within the intendment of sections 181 
and 182 of the Tax Law." 
POINT NO. 2 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, WHICH IS 
NOT IN CONFLICT, SHOWS THAT PLAIN-
TIFF TRANSACTED NO BUSINESS IN UTAH 
WHICH YIELDED THE INCOME UPON 
WHICH THE FRANCHISE TAX IS BASED. 
We, of course, concur in the courts holding that: 
'Though not an income tax, the amount of the franchise 
tax a corporation must pay in Utah is based on the income 
yielded from exercising the privilege of doing business or 
exercising the corporation franchise in Utah" (emphasis 
ours). We argued for such interpretation of the statute 
in our original brief. (Pages 13 and 14 of plaintiff's orig-
inal brief.) The State Tax Commission argued against it 
which it logically must do to sustain its position. (Pages 
10 and 11 of defendant's reply brief.) 
The presumption indulged in by Chief Justic Wolfe 
that plaintiff was doing business in Utah during the tax-
able years in question is of necessity a presumption of law: 
All the evidence relating to this subject is in the record 
and before the court. It shows that prior to the taxable 
years in question, plaintiff ceased to be an operating com-
pany because it had granted to a third party completely 
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and exclusively the right to remove all the oil and gas from 
its Colorado lands for which it reserved certain royalties 
which, in turn, became its sole source of revenue. Plain-
tiff maintained its corporate entity merely as a conduit 
to distribute the net proceeds of such royalties and the ac-
tivities of its officers in Utah consisted only of the man-
agement of its internal affairs. 
By no stretch of the imagination could the income upon 
which the tax is imposed under this decision be attributable 
to any gainful pursuit carried on by plaintiff in the State 
of Utah. An examination of the items listed in the last 
paragraph of the opinion as "petitioners business activities 
in Utah" to "bolster" the presumption relied upon to sus-
tain the decision herein, will clearly disclose that nothing 
therein listed contributed in any manner whatsoever to 
produce the royalties received by plaintiff from its oil and 
gas leases covering lands in the State of Colorado. The 
best evidence of this was gratuitously included in the rec-
ord in this case by the State Tax Commission which shows 
that subsequent to the taxable years in question, the com-
pany was completely liquidated and dissolved and all its 
properties in Colorado were distributed in kind to its 
stockholders, who now receive directly the royalties for-
merly received indirectly through the corporate conduit. 
Can it even be imagined that these royalties presently re-
ceived by the former stockholders of the company are at-
tributable to business carried on by them in Utah? 
The authorities uniformly hold, under the facts as es-
tablished in this case, that a corporation is not doing bus-
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iness within the purview of the franchise tax statute be-
cause, as pointed out by the court in People V. Knapp 
(supra), the so called "business activities" of plaintiff "re-
lated to the management of its internal affairs, the owning 
and holding of property, and the distribution of its avails, 
and were not exercised *for the purpose of continued efforts 
in the pursuit of profit and gain/ " See also: Eisner v. 
United American Utilities, (Del.) 180 Atl. 590; State V. 
Anniston Rolling Mills, 125 Ala. 121, 27 So. 921; People 
V. Pestner, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1017; Norman V. Southwestern 
R. Company, 42 Ga. App. 812, 157 S. E. 531; McCoach V. 
Minehill Railway Company, 228 U. S. 295; Flint v. Tracy 
Company, 220 U. S. 107; American Jurisprudence, Volume 
51, Page 714, Section 796; American Law Reports, Volume 
124, Page 1110; Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, 73 
Mont. 392, 236 P. 1080; State v. J. C. Maguire Const. Co., 
113 Mont. 324, 125 P. 2d 433; United States V. Emery Bird, 
Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 35 S. Ct. 499, 59 L. Ed. 
825. 
We cited most of these authorities in our original brief; 
but they were neither mentioned nor commented upon in 
the opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe. The decision in the 
present case has no support from the opinion in the case 
of / . M. and M. S. Browning Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993. To the contrary, the Brown-
ing case rests firmly on the proposition that the amount of 
the franchise tax which a corporation must pay in Utah 
is based on income which is produced from and directly 
attributable to its transaction of business in Utah. The 
departure of Chief Justice Wolfe from the settled rule of 
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law announced by the foregoing decisions is not supported 
by the citation of a single judicial decision; ironically, to 
sustain the same, reference is made to some regulation 
promulgated by the defendant, itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in this case rests upon the promulgation 
of a rule which is a drastic departure from the well settled 
law as established by numerous decisions of the courts of 
other states and of the United States. Its impact will 
prejudicially discriminate against many corporations domi-
ciled in Utah and the citizens of this state. It will result 
in double taxation, as it does in this case, which the legis-
lature has expressly declared against. If this decision stands, 
many domestic corporations in the course of time will be 
driven into dissolution or emigration from their domicile 
in this state. Many more, whose organizers might have 
desired a Utah domicile, will forego the dubious privilege 
of making their corporate home in Utah. 
We believe that before this court finally decides to 
adopt a rule of law contrary to that of other jurisdictions, 
with the harmful results which inevitably will follow, it 
should grant a rehearing at which the authorities pertinent 
to this case and the practical effect of this decision can be 
fully argued and considered. If this is done, we will en-
deavor to show and persuade this court that this decision 
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is contrary to established legal principles and against the 
public policy of this state. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. E. HENDERSON, of 
RAY, RAWLINS, 
JONES & HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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